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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                        
No. 07-2860
                        
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
CALEEM BOONE, 
                    Appellant 
                          
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 06-cr-00475) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin 
                        
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 11,  2008 
Before:  McKEE, SMITH and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
(Filed: October 21, 2008) 
                        
OPINION OF THE COURT 
                        
MCKEE, Circuit Judge. 
        Caleem Boone appeals his conviction and the sentence that was imposed after he
was found guilty of  possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, possession of a
2firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, and possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), and 
 924 (c)(1)(A) and.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.  
 Since we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with this case, we need
not recite the factual or procedural history in detail.  Boone argues that his conviction
should be vacated because of the prosecutor’s closing argument, and because the district
court erred in assessing criminal history points for a juvenile probation in 2000. 
A.
 Since Boone did not object to the prosecutor’s closing, we review for plain error.
In order to show plain error, Boone must show: (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) affects
substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, we may exercise our discretion to
address the error if, (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.  Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997) 
Error is plain when it is clear or obvious.  Error affects substantial rights of the accused if
it affected the outcome of the trial.
Boone’s intent was the central issue at trial.  During the trial, the district court
repeatedly instructed the prosecutor not to elicit testimony about that ultimate issue. See
Fed.R. Evid. 704(b) (“No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or
condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an
3element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for
the trier of fact alone.”).  
Detective Palmer was called as a witness for the prosecution and testified that
Boone did not possess the drugs in question in a manner that was consistent with personal
use.  In referring to that testimony during the closing argument, the prosecutor 
 told the jury that the government’s expert  had testified that “these [drugs] were
possessed with intent to deliver.”  Boone argues that the prosecutor’s closing constituted
plain error and that the statement was sufficiently prejudicial to require a new trial.   The
government maintains that the prosecutor was merely summarizing Detective Palmer’s
testimony.
Although we agree that the prosecutor’s closing could have been more carefully
worded, the record simply does not support a finding that that single statement was so
egregious as to affect the outcome of the proceedings. See United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 734-35 (1993).  
The statement constituted only a single sentence in a lengthy closing, and trial
counsel did not think it sufficiently egregious to warrant an objection at the time. See
United States v. Sacony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 238 (1940) (“[c]ounsel for the
defense cannot as a rule remain silent, interpose no objections, and after a verdict has
been returned seize for the first time on the point that the comments to the jury were
improper and prejudicial.”). 
4 Moreover, the district court explicitly informed the jury that the closing arguments
were not to be considered as evidence.  “Our theory of trial relies upon the ability of a
jury to follow instructions.” United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1147 (3d cir. 1993). 
Accordingly, Boone cannot satisfy his burden of showing that the prosecutor’s comments
during closing argument amounted to plain error. 
B.  
Boone also argues that the district court erred in factoring his juvenile offenses
into the Guideline calculation.  He claims that the record does not establish a sentence of
confinement for the juvenile transgressions.  However, since Boone did not contest the
PSR’s conclusions when asked if he had any objection, the sentencing court was entitled
to accept the factual conclusions in the PSR as established fact.  See Fed. R. Crim. P.
32(i)(3)(A). See also, United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2008); and United
States v. Siegel, 477 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 2008).  Accordingly, any challenge to the trial
court’s reliance on the juvenile convictions has been waived.
II.  Conclusion
For the reasons noted above,  we will affirm the judgment of conviction and
sentence.
